In 2011, Bolivia became the first modern country to directly elect national judges. Reformers heralded the adoption of judicial elections as a "democratization of justice," by which institutional independence would be assured, public confidence in the judiciary might be expanded, and various maladies of the judicial system would find resolution. We evaluate the elections in light of these objectives. We show candidates were advantaged when voters shared their partisan and demographic traits, resulting in unprecedented diversity on the national courts.
Surveying the controversies surrounding judicial selection from the 4 th century until the 20 th , Haynes (1944) claimed "whole shelves could be filled with the speeches, debates, books and articles that have been produced....dealing with the choice and tenure of judges" (4-5). Even today, these debates revolve around two key issues: guaranteeing the system will select qualified judges, and ensuring that those judges will be sufficiently independent once they reach office (Haynes 1944) . The institutional remedies to these concerns vary widely across constitutional systems. To guarantee a sufficient level of legal expertise among national jurists, many constitutions stipulate eligibility requirements for judicial candidates' age, legal training, previous professional experience, or tenure within the justice system (Elkins, Ginsberg, and Melton 2014) . Institutional solutions to the question of independence often turn on judicial selection procedures, which regulate the political actors involved in judicial selection processes. Historically, constitutions placed responsibility for the selection and confirmation of judges in the hands of the executive and/or legislative branches of government (Haynes 1944) . However, the latter half of the 20th century has seen the dramatic expansion and decentralization of judicial selection processes, opening the door for direct citizen participation in the nomination, evaluation, and selection of national judicial authorities (Garoupa & Ginsburg 2009; Rios-Figueroa 2011) .
With the ratification of its new constitution in 2009, Bolivia extended this populist logic to become the first country in the modern world to select judges with national jurisdiction via universal and direct popular vote. 1 On October 16th, 2011, Bolivian voters selected 56 judges to the Bolivian Supreme Court (Tribunal Supremo de Justicia), the Plurinational Constitutional Tribunal (Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional) , the Bolivian Agricultural Court (Tribunal Agroambiental), and the Bolivian Judicial Council (Consejo de Magistratura), in a highly divisive electoral contest (Driscoll and Nelson 2012) .
Though initial support for the adoption of judicial elections was widespread, the reformation process was controversial (Driscoll and Nelson 2013) , and the implementation of this inaugural contest was undeniably contentious (Driscoll and Nelson 2014) . Still, many aspects of this election have not been subjected to systematic empirical scrutiny. We take this opportunity to evaluate the Bolivian elections based the arguments made by proponents and opponents of this institutional reform, considering their impact on the judges selected for office and on public confidence for the national judiciary. Though the elections were ostensibly adopted as a means to ensure the nomination of a depoliticized, professionally expert panel of judges, our analysis reveals that the most successful candidates were those whose demographic and political characteristics mirrored those of voters, irrespective of the judicial candidates' professional qualifications. Additionally, we show that public confidence in the courts and justice system has increased since the election among government supporters, though it has decreased overall.
Independence from Whom?: The Evolving Logic of Judicial Selection Procedures
A noted commonality of constitutions the world over is the shared assumption that judicial authorities ought to be politically independent. However, the constitutional history of judicial selection systems reveals evolving assumptions about which authorities or institutions pose the greatest threat to the political independence of high courts and judges. Whereas judicial authority was originally conceived as an extension of administrative power, the selection of judges in the 17th century centralized judicial selection exclusively in the hands of European monarchs (North & Weingast 1989; Haynes 1944) . By the time of the American and French Revolutions, the instrument of independent judicial review emerged as a widely accepted constitutional tool of executive constraint, leading many constitutional assemblies to adopt separation of powers systems, wherein judicial selection would require the joint assent of both elected branches of government, often with supermajority approval. Table 1 describes the constitutional changes to judicial selection processes across Latin
America from the time of independence until today. Though all of these countries originally adopted separation of powers systems with formally independent courts, there has been considerable variation in the placement of the judicial selection authority both cross-sectionally and over time. The most centralized of these judicial selection processes (seen at the top of Table 1 ) concentrates both the nomination and selection powers in the hands of a single legislative authority, typically a unicameral legislature or in a joint legislative session requiring multiple chambers.
Much like the early constitutions of continental Europe and the judicial nominations of 18th century England, this centralization of judicial selection in the legislative branch appears to have been common in the smaller, Central American countries in the 1840's and 50's. Still, the majority of the early Latin American constitutions utilized arrangements similar to that of the U.S. Constitution, dividing the power to nominate and select judges across multiple legislative chambers or between the legislative and executive branches of government. Even given this variation, one clear lesson from Table 1 is that the business of selecting judges has historically been the exclusive domain of political elites.
[ Table 1 Here]
Scholars document a recent trend towards the 'opening' of judicial selection processes, as judicial selection procedures increasingly involve judicial authorities, the legal academy, or even the public (e.g. Rios-Figueroa 2011; Garoupa & Ginsburg 2009) . Rios-Figueroa (2011) notes that the average number of actors participating in the process of appointing judges of the constitutional courts has steadily increased in Latin America since the 1970s, with the average now beyond the traditional two (the executive and legislative branches), a shift which is clearly seen in Table 1 .
Capitalizing on the reputational and professional pressures of the judicial system itself, several contemporary Latin American constitutions grant substantial influence to judicial councils in the process of judicial selection (Colombia 1991; Ecuador SC 2008) , or even the Supreme Court itself , a practice that is now common the world over (Garoupa & Ginsburg 2009) . RiosFigueroa (2011) notes that these more open systems may change the type of candidate who is selected; the participation of civil society int the appointment process widens the pool of potential candidates, leading to the selection of judges with less traditional backgrounds. At the same time, the introduction of civil society into these processes is thought to lessen the grip of the legislative and executive branches on the process, perhaps emboldening judges to participate more actively in the policymaking process (Malleson and Russell 2006; Ferreres Comella 2004) .
The most dramatic manifestation of this trend has been the direct election of judges, a phenomenon which is widely considered unique to the U.S. states (e.g. O'Connor 2009). Though
Bolivia is the only country worldwide to elect its national jurists in the modern era, it is not the first country to adopt this institutional convention. Haynes (1944) reports that national judicial elections were adopted in France in 1790, owning to "the democratic fervor that inspired the Revolution" (158).
2 Judicial elections were also adopted across most of Central America following the independence from Spain in the early 1820's. 3 As with the France, these countries soon abandoned direct elections in favor of a centralized and elite-based process in which the legislature both nominated and selected national judges. 4 As a point of comparison, while many U.S. states contemplated the direct election of some of their judges, France opted to directly elect its national judicial authorities nearly 40 years before Mississippi-the first state to elect all of its judges-adopted the institution in 1832 (Shugerman 2012) .
As with the French Revolutionaries, the Central American independence movements, and the populists in the U.S. states, widespread dissatisfaction with representative government and the disintegration of traditional party systems led reformers in both Venezuela (1999) , modifications), and Bolivia (2009 to prioritize the participation of a broad base of citizens in their judicial selection processes. The stated goal of these reforms is to 'democratize' the justice system, ensuring citizen participation in the judicial selection process so as to expand public confidence in national courts. The 2009 Bolivian constitution took this logic to a relative extreme 2 The French experiment with direct judicial elections was mixed and short lived: following the election of "one painter, two engravers, one sculptor, two store clerks, [and] one gardener," the Convention was so disgruntled with the results it provided itself the legal ability to modify or disregard judicial decisions that "no longer inspired respect." The elections were abandoned just 10 years later (Haynes 1944, 158) . 3 The modern day countries of Costa Rica, Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Honduras were formerly the Spanish viceroyalty of Guatemala, and in 1823 formed the Federation of Central American States. Each state was granted complete administrative and legal autonomy and was organized under a loose federal government which was dissolved in 1840. 4 The noted exception is Guatemala, whose constitution provided for the direct election of all Supreme Court judges until 1921 . Between 1921 and 1935 , only the President of the Supreme Court was subject to direct election.
by requiring all national judges to be subject to direct popular elections. 5 To better understand this the motives and consequences of this change, we now discuss the constitutional adoption and implementation of the Bolivian judicial elections of 2011.
Judicial Elections in Bolivia: Adoption and Implementation
The Plurinational Bolivian State is a landlocked country in the heart of South America. With more than 30 indigenous nations claiming Bolivia as its ancestral home, it is among the most ethnically diverse countries in South America. It is also the poorest and most unequal of its neighbors (Fearon 2003) . Until the turn of the 21st century, Bolivian democracy was noted for its relatively stable, albeit elite-driven and largely exclusionary, constitutional democracy (Gamarra 1997) . By the close of the 20th century, the traditional party system on which this "pacted" democracy hinged gave way to a new era of national politics marked with compelling political newcomers, institutional gridlock and periodic bouts of political protests and violence (Centellas 2009; Boulding 2010) . While traditional parties struggled to maintain political relevance, mestizo President Evo
Morales Ayma and his Movimiento al Socialismo (Movement to Socialism, or MAS) party have channeled the widespread dissatisfaction, converting the long-marginalized indigenous majority into a potent electoral machine (Alpert et al. 2010 ). This dramatic transformation of the electoral geography has aligned political ideologies with regional, ethnic and economic cleavages, posing serious threats to democratic stability on multiple occasions. Far from a temporary political enigma, Morales and the MAS stand ready to shape the landscape of Bolivian politics for a foreseeable future (Singer 2007; Alpert et al 2010). 6 Against this backdrop of political flux and institutional turbulence stood a long maligned 5 Though Bolivia is the only country to have currently adopted judicial elections at the national scale, it is neither the first nor the last country to consider this reform. Hugo Chávez proposed the direct election of Constitutional Magistrates during his tenure as President of the Venezuelan Constitutional Assembly, though this proposal did not survive the constitution writing process (Latin American Weekly Report 1999). In 2013, Argentina passed a law that would called for the direct election of 12 of the 19 members of the national judicial council, though the law was struck down by the Argentine Supreme Court before it took effect (H.C. 2009; Llanos and Schibber 2008) . 6 An absolute majority brought Morales to power in 2005, with the MAS winning a majority of the lower chamber of Congress (Singer 2007) . His presidency was renewed and the MAS seatshare expanded to a super-majority of the bicameral Plurinational Legislative Assembly in 2010 (Alpert et al. 2010) . In April of 2013, the Constitutional Tribunal cleared the way for Morales to seek a third term, a contest which by all accounts he is expected to win.
judiciary. Under the 1967 constitution, national judges were selected in a congressional procedure requiring a two-thirds majority vote in a joint session of the National Congress. In practice, this super-majoritarian requirement was often achieved by dividing judicial posts among national political parties according to a system of political patronage, or cuoteo (Mesa 2008 (Mesa , 2010 . With the dissolution of the traditional party system, the process of judicial nominations became increasingly contentious and polarized, frequently resulting in inquorate national courts (Castangnola and Peréz-Liñán 2010).
In August 2006, a MAS dominated Constitutional Assembly convened to draft a constitution document that would better reflect the new realities of the Bolivian political system. Along with devolved political power to prioritize indigenous and local interests, the 2009 constitution provided for the direct election of judges to each of the four national judicial institutions. 7 To balance the need to inform voters regarding candidates' merits while ensuring a depoliticized electoral process, the constitutional reformers opted for a non-partisan electoral process, in which all party affiliations, campaigns or formal endorsements were explicitly prohibited. In addition to baseline education and age requirements, candidates are subject to a candidate pre-selection process by the bicameral Plurinational Legislative Assembly, which requires the approval of two-thirds of its members in a joint legislative session.
The constitution situates the national electoral court (the Órgano Electoral Plurinacional, or OEP) as the clearinghouse for all information pertaining to the election process and the dissemination of all candidates' qualifications. To facilitate voters' considerations of the candidates' professional merits in the inaugural contest, the OEP provided standardized voter information guides that documented the professional experience and biographical information of each candidate, including their name, department of origin, indigenous identification as well as candidates' academic, professional and intellectual achievements. Finally, a randomly assigned number and picture were provided, identical to those listed on the ballot. Figure 1 shows an example of a candidate profile, the rest of which are available at http://jedi.wustl.edu. Though the constitution prohibited campaigns for or against individual candidates, the opposition instead lobbied voters to boycott the elections entirely (Driscoll and Nelson 2014 
Partisanship, Descriptive Representation and Professional Experience
The adoption and implementation of the Bolivian elections was fraught with controversy, with both proponents and opponents of elected judges raising arguments about the ability of voters to make informed choices on election day given the lack of information caused by the ban on campaigning. Though the constitutional prohibition on campaigning as originally viewed as necessary to ensure a depoliticized election and the meritocratic evaluation of candidates (Órgano Electoral Plurinacional 2011a), critics faulted the candidate pre-selection process for prioritizing indigenous affiliation over meritocracy, and claimed the OEP's informational efforts were fundamentally deficient. Here we provide an overview of these arguments and assess them using data on judicial candidate success from the 2011 election to the Constitutional Tribunal. Our empirical analysis combines municipal-level election returns, candidate characteristics, and municipal-level census data to evaluate the combined effects of district level electoral composition and candidates' ethnicity, gender, political commitments and professional experience on candidate success in the inaugural contest.
Party Affiliation
To avoid the overt politicization of the judicial elections, the Bolivian constitution prohibited all party affiliations and campaigning in the judicial elections, on penalty of candidate disqualification (Bolivian Constitution, Art. 181, section 9). Candidate partisan affiliation was not listed on the ballot or voter information guide, and candidates were prohibited from publicizing any political affiliation. Moreover, to ensure that the elections would remain apolitical, media coverage of the judicial candidates was strictly censured, prohibiting interviews that might construe favor or confer any candidate free publicity. Despite these formal prohibitions, some candidates were singled out by the national press for their direct affiliations with the government party as MAS party organiz-ers, legislative aides or legal advisors (30 candidatos 2011). We evaluate the possibility this would have conferred an advantage to these MAS-affiliated candidates, perhaps by increasing their name recognition in an otherwise non-partisan race (Baum 1987) . We assess whether candidates who were publicly identified as government affiliates garnered higher vote shares.
Beyond any direct effect that increased media coverage may have provided, we also investigate the extent to which partisan voting occurred in this ostensibly nonpartisan election. If the increased media coverage informed voters about candidates' party affiliations, then we expect that majority party candidates would be especially successful in those districts where the MAS party had previously been successful in formally partisan races. To this end, we also expect a conditional effect between a candidate's publicized governmental affiliation and the historical success of the government party in the district.
Of the 28 candidates who sought election to the Constitutional Tribunal, national media sources identified twelve candidates with previous experience as aides or candidates of the MAS party, who we coded as Government Affiliates ( This variable ranged from 1.4% to 100%, with the modal values approximating 50%. Taking this as a measure of Government Stronghold, we interact this measure with Government Affiliate to explore the extent to which partisan voting may have benefited candidates ostensibly affiliated with the governing party.
Demographic Characteristics
A consideration for judicial diversity weighed heavily in the Bolivian debates to justify the adoption of judicial elections. The direct election of judges in Bolivia was described as a "democratization" of the Bolivian judiciary, and the adoption of judicial elections coincided with the larger transformation of the Bolivian national identity toward increased representation for local and indigenous interests in all levels of government. The Plurinational Bolivian Constitution of 2009 confers overt priority to candidates of indigenous descent, while a gender quota ensures par-ity among the candidates. Given this stated priority of diversity promotion, we evaluate whether women and indigenous candidates benefited on election day.
Yet our interest in descriptive representation leads us to examine the possibility of a conditional relationship between the concentration of pro-female voters or minorities in a district and the success of a female or minority candidates in that district. If concerns for descriptive representation also weighed heavily in the minds of voters as they cast their ballots, we anticipate that indigenous candidates will receive a boost in districts with a high proportion of indigenous voters, and that female candidates will be favored in districts where women have been previously elected to local executive office.
Though the voter information guide listed candidates' self-reported indigenous affiliation, the ballots also advertised candidates' ethnicity and gender based on the pictures on the ballots.
In practice, every other candidate listed on the ballot was female, seven of which were listed to be of indigenous descent in their candidate profiles, four of which our coders identified as Overtly Indigenous. 9 Exemplary profiles of Overtly Indigenous and Self-identified Indigenous are pictured in Figure 2 .
[ Figure 2 about here]
From the 2001 Bolivian census we collected municipal-level data on the Percent Indigenous, which was the percent of the municipal population who self-identified as of indigenous decent.
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This variable ranged from 1.5% to 100%, with a mean of 71% and a median of 87%. 11 The literature on the success of female candidates in legislative elections suggests that ensuring descriptive representation of women may depend on the area's history of electing female candidates rather than the sex of the voters (Fox and Oxley 2003) . To this end, we relied on the 2010 Mayoral election returns to determine whether the municipality has a Female Mayor (Órgano Electoral Plurinacional 2010).
Professional Experience
The meritocratic selection of judges was an oft-cited motivation for adopting judicial elec- Further, all nominees are subject to approval by the National Assembly; the Assembly vetted all
candidates by a two-thirds majority before judicial aspirants could appear on the ballot.
Tasked with the administration of the country's first judicial contest, the OEP sought to balance concerns for the informed and meritocratic evaluation of candidates while attempting to shield candidates' party affiliations from voters. The voter information guides distributed by the OEP documented each candidate's professional, academic and judicial experience with a short biographical profile. The stated purpose of the guide was to ensure that voters "could chose and vote in an informed and conscientious manner" while selecting the candidates on the basis of their merits rather than partisan or political connections (Órgano Electoral Plurinacional 2011b ). An example of this information is shown above in Figure 1 . To create a measure that encapsulates the varied experiences of the Bolivian judicial candidates, we first coded the information presented in the voter information guide, recording all mentions of candidates' professional experiences, academic formation, evidence of academic produc-13 Extant research generally leans on incumbency and campaign spending as metrics of candidate quality (Abramowitz 1989) , as well as previous performance in office (Canes-Wrone et al. 2002) , ideological location, campaign resources (Jacobson and Kernell 1983; Bond, Covington, and Fleisher 1985) , professional experience (Bonneau and Hall 2009 ) and other valence characteristics (Stone, Maisel and Maestas 2004) . As for judicial candidates in the U.S. Hall and Bonneau (2006) evaluate judicial candidate quality based on previous experience and service on the bench. Estimates with alternative parameterizations are presented in our appendix. Our results do not change. tivity, and areas of expertise.
14 We constructed a measure of candidates' professional experience using a logistic item-response model, akin to the ideal point models used to estimate legislators' or judges' ideal points from roll call or case voting. 15 We take candidates' professional qualifications as a latent variable Qualifications as an outcome to be measured.
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Our measure of candidates' professional qualifications has a minimum of -1.92 and a maximum of 1.22. The mean of the data is −.28 and the median is −.14, and the data have a slight negative skew. Table 2 presents the full list of the educational and professional experiences for candidates who were rated relatively low and relatively high, providing face validity to our measure. At one end of the spectrum, a candidate was a legal secretary with extensive professional experience, though only some of which pertained to law or the legal training. At the high end of our qualifications measure, the candidate had completed multiple graduate or doctoral degrees, some of which were acquired at international institutions, and had experience as a departmental and national judge. This same candidate reported multiple academic works pertaining to constitutional and tax law. These profiles were the third highest and the third lowest of our IRT ranking, and are similar to the candidates with similarly low or high scores.
14 We coded candidates' experience as judges at the local, district and national level as well as their experience as aides to judicial authorities (akin to clerkships or officers of the court). We classified all mention of educational training based on the reported credentials, and areas of academic expertise. We recorded all reported examples of academic productivity, including the authorship of books and articles and the level of professorial experience in legal training (instruction of undergraduates, supervision of graduate students, or deanship). Finally, we recorded candidates' experience as a lawyer in a private practice and their reported areas of legal expertise. 15 Taking the list of all reported professional qualifications across all candidates as the universe of possible qualifications, we then used each qualification as a 'vote' for our IRT model. All professional designations were dichotomized such that each judge was coded a '1' if he had stated experience in a particular professional position, field of expertise or educational arena, while the '0' in corresponded to a candidate not having a stated qualification. Taken from the literature on educational testing, the model takes J test-takers who are quizzed on K items, with y jk = 1 if the response is correct. The model is then:
where α j is the ability of person j, β k is the difficulty of item k and [i] is the individual response of each person on any given item k, leaving open the possibility that individual may not answer all of the items. 16 The IRT model has the advantage of incorporating a large variety of professional experiences by which a candidate may advertise her relative experience without imposing artificial requisites of an 'ideal' career trajectory. Also, though the information provided in the candidate profile was semi-standardized by the OEP, the information reported was not identical for each candidate. In other words, we may not know all of the candidates' professional history simply because they chose not to report it, but rather reported other professional accomplishments instead. At the same time, we incorporate the full set of information available to voters via the voter information guide, because the candidates were explicitly prohibited from campaigning and thereby providing voters with additional information.
[ Table 2 about here]
Empirical Model of Candidate Success
Our data come from official election returns released by the Bolivian government in the days following the 2011 elections. For the purposes of this analysis, we consider candidate success in the Plurinational Constitutional Tribunal contest given its position at the apex of the Bolivian constitutional system. The unit of analysis is the candidate-municipality; there is one observation for each candidate in each municipal district in the country.
17 Our data and all replication files are available at http://jedi.wustl.edu.
The outcome variable in our analysis is the proportion of the valid votes received by each candidate in the race. Because the outcome variable is continuous along the 0-1 interval, we estimate a hierarchical logistic regression model. Logistic regression on a proportion, like our outcome variable, has the effect of "unbounding" our outcome beyond the 0-1 interval. To account for the fact that the vote shares are grouped by candidate, the model includes random intercepts for each candidate. 18 The appendix provides a thorough examination of the robustness of our results to alternative measurement strategies.
Notably, in addition to our covariates of theoretical interest, we include a control for Ballot Position based on the order in which the candidates appeared on the ballot. Studies show that candidates who appear at the top of the list of candidates tend to receive more votes than candidates who appear at the bottom of the list (Miller and Krosnick 1998; Ho and Imai 2011) . Candidates in the Bolivian judicial elections were randomly assigned their ballot positions, and the number for the voter information guide corresponded with the candidate's ballot position.
17 Though individual-level survey data would be ideal, such data does not exist for the recent Bolivian elections. Instead, we opt for municipal-level vote returns-the most disaggregated data available to which we could match municipal-level demographic data. In doing so, we acknowledge the risks of ecological inference, whereby individual level behaviors are inferred from aggregate data. Though several statistical approaches provide partial corrections for these inferential challenges (King, Rosen and Tanner 2004) , our interest in vote choice across 28 candidates renders available solutions informationally intractable.
18 Our data present a series of modeling challenges: vote shares are bounded between 0 and 1, they are hierarchical structured, and vote shares within a district must sum to 1, meaning they are compositional in nature. We chose to emphasize the hierarchical nature of the data. Because the questions we seek to answer imply variance at both the district and candidate level, many alternative approaches are unsuitable for our task. Hierarchical logistic regression allows us to include the necessary covariates, as well as the interactions between candidate-and district-level covariates.
[ Table 3 about here] Table 3 shows the results of the hierarchical logistic regression model. We find some support for the contention that candidates' sociodemographic characteristics impacted candidate vote shares, particularly as those characteristics reflected the demographic and partisan composition of the municipality. To better understand the effects of these characteristics on the candidates' expected vote shares, Figure 3 plots the marginal effects of Government Affiliate and Overtly Indigenous across the range of demographic characteristics present in the Bolivian municipalities.
[ Figure 3 about here]
The top panel of Figure 3 shows the effects of a candidate's affiliation with the MAS party on her received vote share. Again, candidate partisanship was not present on the ballot or the voter guide, though the national press publicized the identities of ostensibly MAS affiliated candidates.
The graph suggests that, across all observed levels of Government Stronghold, MAS candidates did not receive any benefit or penalty at the polls.
However, the effect of Ballot Postion masks the presence of partisan voting. 19 The marginal effect of Government Affiliate becomes statistically significant for those candidates at the 17th ballot position and below for those districts where the MAS-affiliated mayoral candidate received a majority of the vote in 2010. In these districts, a MAS-affiliated judicial candidate listed toward the bottom of the ballot received about a 1-2% boost in vote share. While these effects may seem small, please recall that 28 candidates appeared on the ballot, so effects of this magnitude would have meaningfully differentiated between candidates. Indeed, had the third place winner and previous Morales' appointee (listed 7th on the ballot), Ligia Velásquez Castaños's vote share been reduced by 2% in all of the MAS strongholds, her national vote total would have been reduced by nearly one half, dropping her to 13 th place in the overall race.
The second panel of Figure 3 shows the effect of being Overtly Indigenous on a candidate's vote share. The graph clearly shows that as the concentration of indigenous citizens increases, 19 Both plots in Figure 3 were generated holding Ballot Position at its median value, 14.
overtly indigenous candidates received a noted boost at the polls. This effect is statistically significant irrespective of ballot position, and substantively important. Assuming the candidate is positioned at the middle of the ballot, an easily identifiable indigenous candidate competing in a municipality that is 50% indigenous can expect to receive about a 10% increase in vote share; as the concentration of indigenous residents increases to 100%, the effect of being an indigenous candidate approaches a 20% expected increase in vote share. Macario Cortez Chavez, the candidate pictured on the right in Figure 2 , provides an example of the substantive importance of this effect.
Chavez self-identified as indigenous in the voter information guide but was not classified by our coders as appearing to be Overtly Indigenous. Though his candidacy fared quite well, his national vote total placed him about 16,000 votes shy of winning a seat on the Tribunal. Our results suggest that, had he overtly advertised his indigenous identity, he would have easily secured a place on the court.
Neither constituent term nor their interaction for Female Candidate or Female Mayor is statistically significant, providing no evidence that women were either advantaged or disadvantaged at the polls. Also, examining the effects of the Candidate Qualification Score, the estimated coefficient is not statistically significant in any of the models we examined. The model also provides no evidence that voters differentiated among candidates on the basis of professional qualifications.
Finally, the effect of Ballot Position deserves mention. The estimated coefficient is negative and statistically different from zero, indicating that candidates who were listed towards the bottom of the ballot (e.g. high Ballot Position) received systematically lower expected vote shares. Again, Macario Cortez Chavez, the candidate pictured on the right in Figure 2 , provides an example of this effect's importance. Chavez, who was the second candidate listed on the ballot, received a 4% increase in vote share in every district compared to what he would have received if he had been the second-to last candidate on the ballot. This effect is huge, especially considering the very large number of candidates and the fact that candidate ordering was random.
What can we take from these empirical results? First, though partisanship was officially prohibited and the voters were provided with no information on candidates' party affiliation on the voter information guide or the ballot, our results suggest there was partisan voting among MAS supporters which improved the electoral performance of candidates which the national media had identified as government (MAS) affiliates. This is perhaps surprising given the limited informational environment in which the election took place. 20 Second, the direct election of the national judges expanded the diversity of the high courts dramatically in terms of ethnic composition of the bench. Though more than 60% of Bolivians auto-identify as indigenous or mestizo, the first high court justice of indigenous decent in the country's history was only nominated to office by President Morales in 2010. In the elections, by contrast, 3 of 7 seats were won by candidates of indigenous background, thanks in large part to indigenous voters. 21 Finally, there is no evidence that the candidates with higher levels of professional qualifications received a boost at the polls.
Politically speaking, the effect of the closed nomination process and partisan voting on behalf of MAS voters was evident: candidates with previous affiliations with the MAS were the majority on both the Constitutional Tribunal and the Agro-ambient court, with a single seat on the Supreme Court and the Judicial Council being filled by previous MAS affiliates. Yet these were also the most diverse courts in the nations' history, with roughly equal number of men and women on each court, and an unprecedented number of judges from indigenous decent elected to office.
After the Elections: The Short Term Effects
The 56 popularly elected magistrates were officially sworn into office by President Morales on January 3, 2012. How have the new courts and elected judges fared? Just two years later, President Morales described the justice system as one of the major failings of his administration of 2013 (Morales 2014) . Being careful so as to not directly implicate the elected authorities, he acknowledged that corruption is prevalent, trials and sentencing are frequently delayed, and the Bolivian justice system has remained in a state of general malaise and crisis. Speaking directly 20 Notably, this finding is consistent with the work of Baum (Baum 1987; Rock and Baum 2010) who suggests that partisanship is a strong heuristic for voters even when candidates' party is absent from on the ballot. 21 Of course, the inclusion of diverse representatives does not guarantee the inclusion of diverse perspectives in the policy making process, as descriptive and substantive representation are by no means coterminous (Pitkin 1967) . Indeed, it is simply too soon to evaluate if or how the election of these judges has fundamentally changed the political landscape or substantive policy outcomes.
to the increased representation of indigenous interests in the national courts, Morales described the change as insufficient: "In vain we have incorporated poncho y pollera (traditional indigenous garb) in the justice system; it hasn't changed anything" (Cuiza 2014) . Several days later, the newly nominated minister of justice, Elizabeth Gutiérrez, described the selection of authorities by direct election as a "miscalculation." Directly faulting the magistrates of the Judicial Council (Consejo de Magistratura), the administrative body charged with the administration of all subnational courts and judicial careers, Gutiérrez underscored the importance of professional experience and legal expertise in the administration of justice, something she said the judges elected to the Council Has the direct election of judges changed the Bolivian public's perceptions of the courts? Indeed, weak public confidence was an oft-cited motivation for reforming the judiciary, with supporters touting judicial elections as the best way to restore prestige and institutional legitimacy to the national judiciary. These supporters argued that the creation of a direct electoral connection would render a legitimacy to these institutions that would, in turn, bolster the public's confidence in its judicial institutions (Òrgano Electoral Plurnacional 2011a). Opponents of judicial elections argued the opposite: that the implementation of direct elections would lead voters to see judges as 'normal politicians' rather than learned jurists and that this shift in perception would undermine public confidence in their judicial institutions (Romero et al. 2009; Velzé 2010) .
The ideal data to assess these competing views about the effects of judicial elections on public confidence in the Bolivian courts would require both panel data, with waves before and after the election, and a reliable measure of the legitimacy of judicial institutions, like those suggested by Gibson and Caldeira (1992) . Unfortunately, neither is available. Thus, we are confined to an analysis of cross-sectional survey data and the analysis of self-reported public confidence in the judiciary, rather than diffuse support for the courts. 22 This is a distinction with a difference. As Gibson, Caldeira, and Spence (2003) have shown, confidence is more closely related to short-term, specific support rather than long-term diffuse support. As such, our measure likely captures more short term variance in public satisfaction than the alternative concept of diffuse support, and should not be interpreted as necessarily enduring or entrenched public sentiment. 23 The Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) is administered by USAID, the Inter-American Development Bank, the United Nations Development Program in conduction with Vanderbilt University, and are nationally and regionally representative public opinion surveys of voting age adults administered in face to face interviews. spoiling their ballots were also more distrustful of judicial institutions after the fact.
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We also control for multiple alternative explanations of both empirical and theoretical import.
First, it is widely acknowledged that indigenous voters are an important electoral base for the MAS party, who appeared to spoil their ballots with less frequency in the judicial elections (Alpert et al. 2010; Boulding 2010; Driscoll & Nelson 2014) . At the same time, voters in the Eastern departments of Beni, Pando, Santa Cruz and Tarija (collectively known as the Media Luna) were much more likely to spoil their ballots, owning to the concentration of opposition voters in these departments. For these reasons, we included dummy variables for both of these predictors based on respondents' self-identification as indigenous (Auto-ID Indigenous) (as opposed to mestizo, white or black), and whether the respondent lives in the Media Luna.
Next, extant literature on public support for judicial institutions (e.g. Gibson, Caldeira, and Baird 1998; Gibson and Caldeira 1992; Gibson and Nelson 2014b ) advances a host of theoretical explanations for which we also control. We include two measures of political sophistication, on the theory that awareness of current events makes respondents more aware of courts and the judicial elections. 26 Additionally, extant literature on public support for the judiciary (Gibson and Caldeira 1992; Gibson and Nelson 2014a) suggests that respondents' basic political beliefs structure their support for judicial institutions, so we include a measures of Democratic Values and beliefs about 25 We acknowledge that in lacking panel data we cannot make claims to causal processes. However, Driscoll and Nelson (2014) discuss the validity of the self-reported vote information in this survey, presenting evidence that they accurately reflect the actual distribution of votes in the 2011 election. 26 We include the respondent's level of Education, which is simply a numeric value for the number of years of schooling for each survey respondent and News Consumption, in which respondents describe the frequency with which they obtain news from any news source: never, rarely, weekly or daily.
Procedural Justice.
27 Finally, we also control for a number of demographic characteristics, including whether the respondent lives in a Rural area (a dichotomous indicator), and their wealth (whether the respondent owns a Cell Phone), as well as the respondent's Age and Gender.
Because the outcome variables in both regressions are ordinal rankings of public confidence in the Supreme Court, we estimated two separate ordinal logistic models for public esteem in the Supreme Court in 2008 and 2012. The model estimates are reported in Table 4 . 28 [ Table 4 about here] 27 Our measure of respondents' attitudes towards democracy combines respondents' affect for democracy generally and Bolivian democracy specifically. The questions queried Bolivian's satisfaction with democracy overall (1-4), respondents' ratings of the quality of Bolivian democracy (1-4) and the extent to which they agreed with the statement that "Democracy may have its problems, but it is still superior to alternative forms of government" (1-7). The composite index of Democratic Values ranges from 3 to 15, and is normally distributed around 10 with a slightly negative skew. Our measure of Procedural Justice combines respondents' attitudes towards their assessment of the fairness judicial institutions; Respondents ranked the extent to which they anticipated courts would ensure a fair trial (1-7) and the extent to which they thought that criminals would be brought to justice if they took a case to a criminal trial. The combined minimum of this variable is 2, the maximum 13, with an observed median value of 6.
28 Though not presented in Table 4 , we also estimated a model on the 2012 data mirroring the specification from the 2008 model exactly to assuage any concerns that the difference in the size of the effect for Morales approval is driven by the introduction of variables for vote choice in the 2011 judicial election. We can attest that this is not the case, and these models are available from the authors upon request.
29 Throughout this discussion, a "high level" of confidence is defined as rating one's confidence above the midpoint on the 7-point scale used to measure confidence in the Supreme Court. All other covariates in the model have been held at their median (for interval-level) or modal (for dichotomous) values.
Yet while the direct election of judges was associated with increased public confidence in the Supreme Court among MAS supporters, confidence in the Supreme Court declined across the country as a whole, an effect which is exacerbated among supporters of the opposition. Indeed, the probability that the modal voter-even assuming he cast a valid vote in the judicial elections-has a high level of confidence in the Supreme Court dropped by half (from 30% in 2008 to 16% in 2012) after the elections. If that voter happened to have been a strong opponent of President Morales, his probability of a high level of confidence in the Supreme Court dropped by over 500% from 22% to 4%. Also evident are the correlates of self-reported blank and null voting on citizens' confidence in the Supreme Court. Confidence in the Supreme Court was systematically lower among those respondents who self-reported spoiling their vote or casting a blank ballot, who were roughly 40% less likely to express a high level of confidence in the newly elected judicial branch of government.
These patterns suggest that the objective of improving citizens' confidence in judicial institutions was partially realized: supporters of the current administration who participated in the election were more likely to express confidence in the Supreme Court following the election, as opposed to before. Yet the opposite is true for all citizens outside of that subset: supporters of the opposition, non-MAS partisans, those who reportedly did not cast a valid ballot are systematically less supportive of the Supreme Court and other judicial institutions. In light of the fact that an absolute majority of voters cast blank and spoiled ballots, this decline in public confidence is troubling indeed.
We acknowledge that the causal story underlying this effect is difficult to parse. On the one hand, voters with lower confidence in political institutions and the Supreme Court voters may have been more likely to spoil their ballots in the first place; it is also possible that voters who were otherwise supportive of the courts were turned off by the electoral process itself, and opted to cast a blank or spoiled ballot as a result. If this is the case, then the elections themselves may have played a role in the decline of public confidence in the Supreme Court. Disentangling these countervailing explanations is impossible with the data we have available, and we leave these interesting and undeniably important questions for future research.
Discussion
The 2011 Bolivian judicial elections were unquestionably a historic event, providing for the first time in recent history the opportunity for a country's citizens to play a role in the selection of its country's national judges. The adoption of this electoral institution was surrounded by polarizing political debate between those who saw the adoption of judicial elections as a panacea to the institutions' chronically low public esteem and those who felt that the adoption of popular elections would only cause further harm to the judicial branch. In the end, one Bolivian constitutional scholar describes the decision to adopt judicial elections this way: "There is a powerful reason why the constituent assembly arrived at its decision and that is that there was no other way: the only way to stop the carnival of party and judicial patronage for once and for all was the direct designation of judges by direct and universal popular vote. "The greater the popular sovereignty in the election of judges, the greater the independence, quality and impartiality in the administration of justice"" (Vargas 2010 , quoting Rebeca Delgado, chairwoman of the Justice Committee of the Bolivian Constitutional Assembly).
In this paper, we attempted to shed some empirical light on several of these assertions, examining the correlates of candidate success and public confidence in the judiciary before and after the initial election. While we are appropriately cautious about our ability to generalize about the long-term effects of these elections, we close the paper by reiterating four conclusions about which our data are clear as well as some broader thoughts about the Bolivian experience might inform future research on judicial elections elsewhere.
First, one major argument given for the adoption of judicial elections in Bolivia was a desire to improve the representation of minorities on the bench. Such arguments fit well with scholarly views that "the more open the appointment procedure, the more likely it is that less traditional judges will arrive at the constitutional court. This is the case because the participation of these organizations would tend to widen the pool of candidates because they prefer judges who represent them better, who do not come from predominantly affluent and conservative backgrounds, and whose views are more expansive and in favor of enforcing social and economic collective rights" (Rios-Figueroa 2011, 38) . 30 The election was unquestionably successful at diversifying the benches of the national Bolivian courts, with the Bolivian judiciary now contains historically high numbers of female and minority jurists. Not only were an unprecedented number of indigenous candidates elected to national judicial office, but our results suggest they have largely indigenous voters to thank for their electoral success. Not only is the current Constitutional Tribunal the most diverse in Bolivian history, but it is the most diverse constitutional court in all of the western hemi-
sphere. This is all the more important in light of the fact that the national judicial institutions were largely foreign to many Bolivians, and the historical exclusion of indigenous Bolivians from the political process. If we take this dramatic increase in indigenous peoples' participation in selecting descriptive representatives on the high courts as evidence of "democratizing justice," then the objectives of the judicial elections not only achieved, but were a resounding success.
Second, the 2009 Constitution laid out a procedure to ensure the meritocratic evaluation of candidates, subject to the approval of a supermajority of the bicameral national assembly. There is little evidence to suggest that these institutional requirements were efficacious in practice. The highly politicized candidate pre-selection process was criticized widely as lacking transparency, opposition involvement or serious meritocratic criteria, allegations which cast a long shadow on the legitimacy of the elections more generally. Instead, the government emphasized the meritocratic evaluation of candidates by providing voters with standardized information about candidate qualifications and investing considerable resources to ensure a depoliticized electoral contest. Though the judicial candidates brought a myriad of professional experiences with them to office, we found no evidence this information was decisive in structuring voters' choices. To the extent that reformers argued that the most qualified candidates would be advantaged under this system, the initial contest illustrates a number of ways in which this ideal can break down.
Third, our analysis of public opinion documents a polarization of public sentiment toward 30 This finding stands in contrast to research in the United States, which typically finds no difference in the relative ability of appointive and elective systems in increasing diversity on the bench (Hurwitz and Lanier 2003, but see Reddick, Nelson, and Caufield 2009) . Combined with Frederick and Streb's (2008; Streb and Frederick 2009 ) our finding may suggest that any shortcoming of judicial elections to place women and minority candidates on the bench originates not from the judicial selection process, but by the pool of candidates available in the first place. Comparison of candidate profiles for candidates who were classified as Overtly Indigenous as opposed to Self-identified Indigenous (though not overtly indigenous in appearance). Both of the candidates listed above self-identified as indigenous in the candidate profile, though only the candidate on the left was coded as appearing to be so. Table 6 . As with the other measure of candidate quality, we find no evidence of substantive effect, and all other results reported in the main body of the paper hold.
Alternative explanations pertaining to information, partisanship and voter sophistication
Even though the institutional rules surrounding the Bolivian elections hold constant a number of potentially alternative explanations, readers may be concerned that our empirical analysis fails to control for an influence that may be highly correlated with one of our key independent variables and the dependent variable and therefore may cause omitted variable bias. As such, we reestimated our model, this time including a variety of control variables for potentially confounding effects.
First, to assess the potential nonrandom distribution of campaign information to rural areas (TSE admite 2011; OEA recomienda 2011), our model includes a measure of the percentage of citizens who have access to electricity (Percent Rural). Second, deeply-held political cleavages divide the eastern and western halves of the country, which have the potential to confound our results pertaining to voters' affinity (or antipathy) for the MAS party (Alpert et al. 2010; Centellas 2009 ). To assess the extent to which these cleavages influence our results, we include a dichotomous variable, coded '1' if the district is in the eastern half of the country (known to Bolivians as the 'half moon' or Media Luna) (Regional Cleavage). Third, models of vote choice often include a measure of voters' level of Wealth. To assess the robustness of our results to the malapportionment of economic circumstances by municipality, the model includes the percentage of citizens in the municipality who own a cell phone. Finally, to counter any effects of predicted level of education on vote choice, the model includes the municipality's Illiteracy Rate.
The results of the regression with these control variables are shown in Table 7 . Though three of the four control variables do appear to have some independent explanatory power, their substantive effect is very small and their inclusion does not change the sign or statistical significance of any of the variables that were the focus of our discussion above. Though not included here in the interest of space, the inclusion of these variables has no affect on the marginal effects of gender, indigenous status, or government affiliation reported in the main text. Additional analyses are available from the authors upon request. 
